

Fault-Tolerant RISC-V Softcore: SRAM-Based FPGA Implementation and Reliability Testing



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
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Why use open standard ISA Embedded Processors?

New space wants more and more to use open-source hardware and software because designers want to:

- **reuse**
 - **adaptive solutions**: area, performance and power
-
- SRAM-based FPGAs -> configurability
 - Embedded softcore -> open-source, adaptivity
 - processors (RISC-V) -> reuse




- In this work, we propose a mitigation technique method to add redundancy and voting in a softcore RISC-V processor.
- The mitigation is automatically implemented in the RTL level code of the processor.
- We synthesized this **fault tolerant RISC-V** into a SRAM-based FPGA from AMD/Xilinx.
- We evaluate under emulated fault injection different implementations of the TMR.
- Results show the tradeoff between area, number of voters and the reliability of the fault tolerant RISC-V processor.

- **Case-study: RISC-V Steel SoC**
- Radiation effects in SRAM-based FPGA
- Fault Tolerant RISC-V Steel SoC
- Fault Injection Methodology
- Results
- Conclusions

Case-study: RISC-V Steel SoC

- Free, customizable for usage in FPGAs and embedded systems.
- **Modules:** Steel core, Timer, Interconnection Bus, UART, SPI, GPIO and RAM.
- Implements the **RV32I ISA**, the Zicsr extension and the Machine-mode privileged architecture of RISC-V.
- 32-bit processor with 3-stage of pipeline.
- Support for **real-time operating system like FreeRTOS.**




Source: De Oliveira, R. Design of Steel: a RISC-V Core. Lume-UFRGS.
<https://lume.ufrgs.br/handle/10183/219134>

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Radiation effects in SRAM-based FPGA

- SRAM-based FPGAs are very attractive to aerospace applications due to their reconfigurability.
- Softcore processors are common embedded into FPGAs to accelerate and control many types of applications.

- However, radiation can impact SRAM-based FPGAs by inducing faults leading to misconfiguration and malfunction.
- Most common type of faults are bitflips in the **configuration memory bits (CRAM)**, which lead a persistent error in the bitstream, so faults must be masked until the reconfiguration of the FPGA.



Accumulated bitflips in CRAM (persistent effect) -> many ERRORS Corrected by RECONFIGURATION

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Fault Tolerant Mitigation Techniques


- **Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)** with voters is one of the best solutions to mitigate faults in SRAM-based FPGAs, because it can mask the fault until the reconfiguration of the device.
- TMR can be implemented with different types of granularity:
 - Coarse-Grained TMR
 - Fine-Grained Distributed TMR

TMR granularity impacts area, performance and reliability


- **Scrubbing:** continuous reload the original bitstream into the SRAM-based FPGA to correct the bitflips in the CRAM.

Fault Tolerant Mitigation Techniques


Unmitigated RISC-V



Fine grain distributed TMR RISC-V




Coarse grain TMR RISC-V



How many voters are enough?

Voting insertion is selected by analyzing the fan out (f.o.) of the flip-flops (FF)




So, $f.o. \geq 1$ means that all the FF will have voters at the output


Element	FGDTMR			
	$f.o \geq 4$	$f.o \geq 3$	$f.o \geq 2$	$f.o \geq 1$
Registers	4943	4943	4943	4943
LUTs	8134	8362	11719	12550
Voters	264	492	3849	4680

Fault Tolerant RISC-V Steel SoC

Automated redundancy and voter insertion





Source: The author



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Fault Injection Methodology


- **Random bit-flips are injected** in **FPGA's CRAM** to emulate radiation-induced SEUs during benchmark execution at no more than one fault injected per processing cycle.
- Utilizes the **Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP)** to manipulate CRAM contents (ICAP Fault Injector).
- FI affects the configuration of:
 - CLB (without DFF), DSPs
 - BRAM,
 - routing paths



Fault Injection Methodology

The errors are classified in:

- Silent data corruption (SDC)
- Time out



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Case-study Applications:

Two applications are running concurrently in FreeRTOS.

1°: Fixed-point matrix multiplication

```

$MQBU 285,00000000,00000000,11-00,275,0000,B169,2729,FD68,0,0*7B
$MQBU 571,00000000,00000000,11-00,280,FD68,BE26,D4FC,7201,0,0*7D
$MQBU 856,00000000,00000000,11-00,280,7201,8B57,8B0A,C7A2,0,0*7B
$MQBU 1142,00000000,00000000,11-00,280,C7A2,8BD3,9237,F96E,0,0*3F
$MQBU 1429,00000000,00000000,11-00,281,F96E,8843,7736,E89C,0,0*36
$MQBU 1714,00000000,00000000,11-00,279,E89C,2615,74C1,CBE4,0,0*33
$MQBU 2000,00000000,00000000,11-00,280,CBE4,F2B3,9E4E,B943,0,0*36
  
```

Source: The author

Power & temperature

Application ID

time (ms)

System status Information

Check sums of the matrixes:
ID,checkA,checkB,checkResult

3°: Tx de data through the HW interface



2°: Huffman encoding/decoding

```

$HUBU 41,00000000,00000000,11-00,31,0000,00,6721,960B,0,0*73
$HUBU 83,00000000,00000000,11-00,36,960B,10,9B8A,C873,0,0*04
$HUBU 124,00000000,00000000,11-00,36,C873,10,236A,53E5,0,0*47
$HUBU 165,00000000,00000000,11-00,35,53E5,10,DF1C,F733,0,0*49
$HUBU 207,00000000,00000000,11-00,36,F733,10,9DFE,7381,0,0*38
$HUBU 248,00000000,00000000,11-00,35,7381,10,6EB8,5516,0,0*31
$HUBU 292,00000000,00000000,11-00,38,5516,00,49CF,39E8,0,0*3B
  
```

Source: The author

Power & temperature


Application ID

time (ms)

System status Information

Check sums of the Data:
ID,CodingType,checkCoded,checkDecoded

Results: Area




Is the most fine grain TMR (FGDTMR f.o. > 1) the most reliable one?

The FGDTMR f.o. > 1 has more voters, so more errors can be masked in the design.

Element	Configuration					
	Unhard.	CGTMR	FGDTMR			
			f.o. ≥ 4	f.o. ≥ 3	f.o. ≥ 2	f.o. ≥ 1
Block memory	32	32	32	32	32	32
Registers	1,830	4,943 (2.7x)	4,943 (2.7x)	4,943 (2.7x)	4,943 (2.7x)	4,943 (2.7x)
Carry	183	397 (2.2x)	397 (2.2x)	397 (2.2x)	397 (2.2x)	397 (2.2x)
Look-up tables (LUTs)	3,073	7,879 (2.6x)	8,134 (2.6x)	8,362 (2.7x)	11,719 (3.8x)	12,550 (4.1x)
Voters	—	9	264	492	3,849	4,680
Essential bits (Mbit)	0.8	2.0 (2.3x)	2.1 (2.3x)	2.1 (2.4x)	2.7 (3.0x)	2.8 (3.1x)


Results: Reliability

Is **scrubbing** enough? No!




Results: Reliability

Is **TMR enough**? The FGDTMR with voting selection shows different reliability!




Results: Reliability


If we implement **TMR and scrubbing**... all the TMR shows similar results. **Best to choose the TMR with smallest area!**



Pelletron accelerator heavy ions experiment



Assembly of the decapsulated Zedboard (xc7z020clg484-1)





General assembly of the experiment

Comparison of MTTF results

Heavy ions radiation experiment
(Pelletron Accelerator) - SBU/MBU

Fault Injection - SBU



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Conclusions

- An adapted TMR method with flip-flop selection offered insights into scaling FGDTMR while balancing area and reliability.
- The proposed method that **selectively choosing where to add voters** combined with scrubbing showed very good results on achieving **high reliability** and **reduced area**.
- The TMR and voters are added automatically.
- FI method can mimic SBU and MBU radiation data in the FPGA configuration memory.
- This method can fast perform design exploration fault tolerance on RISC-V softcore processors.

Thank you very much!

Questions?

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