



Efficacy of Radiation Hardening by Design Techniques on an ASIC 32-bit RISC-V Microcontroller

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
UNIVERSITY OF
SASKATCHEWAN

Presentation to



Workshop April 2-3, 2025 | Gothenburg

- The RISC-V ISA has made large strides in the space industry recently
- Single Event Effects (SEEs) continue to be a significant reliability issue
 - And continue to get worse as technology nodes scale down!
- More work is needed to understand how best to harden and evaluate devices for high reliability situations



Channel	Substrate	
	Bulk	SOI [†]
Planar	Bulk-Planar ●	SOI-Planar □
Fin*	Bulk-Fin ▲	SOI-Fin ◆

[†] Includes similar substrate structures such as SOS.

* Includes similar three-dimensional channel structures such as a tri-gate.



1. Introduction & Background
2. Device Overview
3. Applied Hardening Techniques
4. Experimental Setups & Results
5. Concluding Remarks




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- SET → SEU (Bit-Flip)

1. Introduction & Background



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


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
- Corrupted Data
- Unintended program jumps
- Device halts
- Complete System Crashes
- Etc





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■ For radiation rich environments, like space, companies provide suitable devices to mitigate the possibility of these errors



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TI TMS570-SEP



- 30 kRad
- SEL > 43 Mev·cm²/mg
- 300 MHz Clock

Vorago VA41630



- 200 kRad
- SEL > 110 Mev·cm²/mg
- 100 MHz Clock

Microchip VA41630



- 30 kRad
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
Most commercially available devices use ARM – not RISC-V!

SEU performance data is limited, or not provided – how is the device hardened?

2. Device Overview



- **StarRISC is radiation-tolerant RISC-V microcontroller device**
 - Built using Global Foundries 22-nm FD SOI technology
- **Utilizes open-source designs, and custom-designed rad-hardened components**
 - Built upon the CORE-V-MCU Project¹




¹<https://docs.openhwgroup.org/projects/core-v-mcu/doc-src/overview.html>

2. Device Overview



- The device features a small and efficient 32-bit core from OpenHW Foundation²
- The core is fully open-source, with configurable options




OpenHW CV32E40P Architectural Block Diagram

2. Device Overview



■ StarRISC is a full System-On-Chip device

- 512 KB of ECC SRAM
- UART x2, I2C x2, QSPI x2, GPIO x32
- Internal SEU counters
- PWM & Timers
- FreeRTOS Support
- On-board hardened PLL
 - Up to ~300 MHz




StarRISC Architectural Block Diagram

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- **StarRISC is supported by a development kit board**

- Power via USB or 9V
- Onboard FTDI JTAG
 - And external port
- Onboard flash memory
- ESP32 for wireless access
- & more!



StarRISC Exposed Die & Development Kit Board

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■ As well as an eclipse-based SDK

- GCC support

```
workspace - cli_test/libs/cli/source/cli_platform.c - CORE-V™-SDK
File Edit Source Refactor Navigate Search Project Run Window Linux Help
Project Explorer x cli_platform.c x Outline x Build T... Docu...
cli_test
  Binaries
  Includes
  app
  Default
  drivers
  hal
  kernel
  libs
  target
  FreeRTOS.h
  FreeRTOSConfig.h
  SDKConfig.h
  utils
  cli_build.sh
  cli_test Ashling Opella-LD.launch
  cli_test Ashling Opella-LD.launch.bak
  cli_test hs2.launch
  cli_test hs2.launch.bak
  gdb_run
  gdb_run_olimex
  header_sim.bin
  header.bin
  Makefile
  openocd-gdbpipe-hs2.cfg
  openocd-gdbpipe-olimex.cfg
  openocd-nexys-Ashling-Opella-LD.cfg
  openocd-nexys-hs2.cfg
  openocd-nexys-olimex.cfg
  openocd.log
  README.md

cli_platform.c
CLI_common.timestamps = 0;
CLI_printf("#*****\n");
CLI_printf("Command Line Interface\n");
CLI_printf("%s %s\n", __DATE__, __TIME__ );
CLI_printf("App SW Version: %s\n", SOFTWARE_VERSION_STR );
CLI_printf("#*****\n");
CLI_print_prompt();
for(;;){
    if( gSimulatorEnabledFlg == 0 )
    {
        k = CLI_getkey( 10*1000 );
        if( k == EOF ){
            continue;
        }
        CLI_rx_byte( k );
    }
    else
    {
        if( gSimulatorCmdTable[gSimulatorCmdTableIndex] != NULL )
        {
            memcpy( (void *)&CLI_common.cmdline[0], gSimulatorCmdTable[gSimulatorCmdT
            CLI_dispatch();
        }
        /*
        * NOTE: Above dispatch() call might not return!
        * If an error occurs, the long jump will occur.
        */
    }
}
```

StarRISC & Core-V-MCU SDK

3. Hardening Techniques



- **StarRISC utilizes a few techniques to reduce its soft error rate (SER):**



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- 1. 22-nm FD SOI Technology node**

- This node is inherently resilient to SEUs


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
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Smaller active
area -> less
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
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


- **Every latch or flip-flop is replaced with our own custom-designed radiation-hardened storage cells**
 - All make use of the “Transistor-Stacking” technique


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Standard Latch




Stacked Transistor Latch


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Standard Latch



Stacked Transistor Latch



- **At the transistor layout level, we also make changes to the design to induce more complex charge-collections³**
 - Which reduce the amplitude of voltage transients

FF Comparison Table

FF Type	Power Usage (n.u)	CLK-Q Delay (n.u)	Cell Area (n.u)	LET Threshold (Mev·cm ² /mg)
Standard Cell	1	1	1	~1
Hardened Cell	1.4	1.4	1.6	>120

With moderate performance penalties we can obtain extremely hardened cells

Z. Li *et al.*, "Efficacy of Transistor Stacking on Flip-Flop SEU Performance at 22-nm FDSOI Node," in *IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science*



- For all irradiation experiments the same test setup was used:




- A test program sends out data logs to be monitored for events
- Extra data about the device can be dumped through the JTAG port and saved via the SDK

4. Experimental Setups & Results



- The testing software used runs a variety of tests monitoring various functionality of the device
 - Can be configured between **looped**, and **non-looped** modes
- **SBU and DBU counts** are logged after each unit test



Test Software Flow


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
- Alpha particle irradiation was performed at USask
- Proton experiments were conducted at TRIUMF using 150 MeV protons
- Heavy Ion experiments were done at TAMU
 - 1E4 particles/cm² flux rate

Ions used @ TAMU

Ion	Linear Energy Transfer (MeV·cm ² /mg)	Range in Si (μm)
Cu	18.4	155
Kr	30.1	149
Ag	43.5	130
Pr	64.1	135



4. Experimental Results – Alpha Particle




- We use an Am-241 source placed directly over the die
- For non-looped testing, no failures or crashed observed
 - 50 SBU/min w/o scrubbing
 - 80 SBU/min w/ entire memory scrubbing
- No DBU observed for non-looped testing
- Some DBUs in unused memory if scrubbed after many hours of irradiation

4. Experimental Results – Protons



- Device was tested with 105 MeV protons up to a combined fluence of 1E12 particles/cm²
- Average SBU rate of 7/minute – non-looped no scrub
 - No DBUs
- No functional failures or crashes for either software mode
- No increased current draw or failures up to 200 kRad



StarRISC undergoing proton testing @ TRIUMF

4. Experimental Results – Heavy Ions



- For non-looped testing no functional failures or crashes detected up to an LET of 96.3 MeV·cm²/mg
 - Tested fluence up to 1E7
- Looped testing presented system failures at every LET tested
- DBUs became much more prevalent




StarRISC undergoing Heavy Ion Testing @ TAMU


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SRAM SBU Cross-Section Per Bit Vs. LET




Overall Device SEFI Cross-Section & DBU Cross-Sections Vs. LET




4. Experimental Results – Heavy Ions



Time Taken for Each Unit Test




Percentage of Unit Tests Resulting in SEFIs



4. Experimental Results – Heavy Ions



Percent Breakdown of Error Codes Seen



Descriptions of Errors Seen During Testing

DEVICE ERROR CODE	DESCRIPTION & LIKELY CAUSE
IS_EXCEPTION	GLOBAL EXCEPTION HAS BEEN RAISED. MACHINE PROGRAM COUNTER, OR INSTRUCTION CODE IS UNDEFINED OR NULL.
PORTASM FAILURE	ERROR DURING CONTEXT SWITCHING OR REGISTER SERVICE ROUTINES. LOADED REGISTER VALUES ARE NULL OR UNDEFINED.
TASK CONTROL FAILURE	PRIORITY VALUES FOR TASKS WITHIN FREERTOS ARE IN UNDEFINED OR NULL STATE
SEMAPHORE FAILURE	QUEUE POINTER IN FREERTOS IS IN A UNDEFINED OR NULL STATE.



■ Proton Testing:

- No failures for either testing mode
- Very few memory errors
- TID tolerance up to 200 kRad

■ Heavy Ion Testing:

- Failures only for looped testing at every LET
- DBUs occur at every LET, but the SEFI cross-section stays relatively constant
- Most SEFIs can be related to corrupted device memory



- **Device SEFI rate tends to be more dependent on the testing software rather than particle LET**
 - Non-looped testing routinely scrubs active memory space
 - Looped testing allows for accumulated memory upsets
- **This suggests that accumulated memory errors contribute to device failures**
 - The core and peripherals are assumed to be exceptionally hard
- **Understanding the failure rate of the device due to SEUs depends on more than LET**
 - Per bit cross-section
 - Particle flux rate
 - Average memory access time & scrub

5. Concluding Remarks – Future Work



- **We are working on developing a probabilistic model that considers these factors to better predict SEFI rates**

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Allows us to
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- Payload aboard the next gen USask cube satellite

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- Pulsed Laser injection testing
- Microbeam testing at ANSTO
- Payload aboard the next gen USask cube satellite
- Potential commercialization

Thank You to our Collaborators!



STARR-Lab
Semiconductor Technology And
Rad-Effects Research Lab

